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Why and How There Should Be More Europe 
in Asylum Policies
Essential Issues
The experiences of the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe highlight the failures of the current mod-
el of having the EU and its members states share responsibility for asylum policies. Based on 
standard criteria of fiscal federalism, this paper analyses the shortcomings of the status quo. We 
show that European asylum policies stand in sharp contradiction to the optimal assignment of 
tasks within a federal system. For example, the current system creates substantial incentives for 
free-riding and foregoes the potential benefits of European economies of scale. Given this diag-
nosis, we explore the pros and cons of different options for a more European approach. In par-
ticular, we analyze and provide estimates of the quantitative implications for the options of: (A) 
quotas that would distribute refugees across countries according to a pre-determined calculation 
of reception capacity; (B) EU financing of national service provision; and (C) EU service provision 
in asylum policies.
Options Considered
First, we show that a pure quota system (Option A) would lead to the relocation of more than 900,000 
asylum seekers in 2015, which would probably give rise to prohibitive political and budgetary costs. 
Second, we calculate that having the EU fully finance the asylum process while its member states 
retain responsibility for service provision (Option B) would mean that the EU budget would need to 
be augmented by roughly €30 billion each year or by some 20 percent, based on current numbers 
of asylum seekers. Lastly, we look at the possibility of having the EU assume responsibility for both 
financing and administering asylum processes in its member states (Option C). Having a European 
service provision by a European Asylum Agency would offer potential economies of scale and advan-
tages in terms of speed and expertise that would significantly reduce the costs of asylum procedures 
(est. €5–12 billion annually). Moreover, under option C a level playing field of hosting conditions, 
asylum procedures, recognition rates and regionally balanced EU reception facilities would eliminate 
the current incentives for refugees to concentrate on a few countries. For these reasons, we recom-
mend a system that would combine EU financing with EU service provision.
Key Messages and 
Recommendations
Introduction
In the summer of 2015, the European Union experienced nothing less than the de facto collapse 
of its Common European Asylum System (CEAS). When the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force 
in 1999, it had opened the way for EU legislation in the field of asylum policies. The EU has set 
ambitious goals for its new common policy: The fundamental right of asylum to people fleeing 
persecution or serious harm was to be applied across participating EU states using uniform stand-
ards.1 The policy was intended to guarantee that refugees would be treated in a dignified and fair 
manner, and to set clear rules stipulating which member state was responsible for an applicant. 
Lastly, including elements of cooperation and solidarity was meant to help ensure fair burden-
sharing.
The last months have shown just how far these objectives remain out of reach. But the recent dra-
matic escalation is not the first time that serious flaws in the system have become apparent. For 
example, in recent years, standards for receiving asylum seekers have continued to vary widely, 
as have the durations and results of application procedures. The so-called Dublin rules stipulate 
that the member state in which a refugee first enters the EU is responsible for hosting the refugee 
and handling all procedures related to his or her asylum application. The most recent version 
(Dublin III), which came into force in July 2013, aims to boost efficiency and guarantee higher 
standards among all member states.2 However, this division of responsibilities between member 
states has led to such striking imbalances that highly burdened entry countries have refrained 
from applying these rules to their full extent. What’s more, with the introduction of temporary 
border controls along several internal EU borders, the failure of the current version of CEAS has 
even started to damage the Schengen system. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, which abolished 
passport and customs controls in the 26-country Schengen Area, is one of the projects that makes 
the benefits of European integration particularly salient. For this reason, any damage to it comes 
at a high cost – in both economic and political terms.
Against this dramatic backdrop, we reconsider on the following pages the appropriate allocation 
of asylum responsibilities in a federal context while applying the criteria of fiscal federalism: 
cross-border externalities and free-riding, economies of scale and preference heterogeneity. In 
doing so, we develop possible options for what might be a fairer and more efficient European ap-
proach to allotting responsibilities while also calculating their quantitative implications. We like-
wise argue that having the current reform debate focus solely on quotas for the distribution of 
refugees is too narrow. In our view, alternative options are comprehensive European financing 
schemes or having EU service provision play a much larger role in asylum procedures up to refu-
gee reception. We contend that only a more comprehensive European strategy including EU ser-
vice provision is a viable and effective strategy for achieving a more even distribution of refugees 
across Europe.
Based on our very conservative estimates of the number of asylum applicants for 2015, we show 
that a full quota system would imply the relocation of more than 900,000 asylum applicants in 2015 
alone. We regard this scale of ex post relocations – many of which will be involuntary – as unreal-
istic. We proceed by quantifying the budgetary implications for a full EU financing of the asylum 
procedure (from the entry of an asylum seeker into EU territory up to the final decision on his or her 
application). We estimate an annual budget of roughly €30 billion for a truly sufficient Asylum, Mi-
gration and Integration Fund3 (AMIF) as realistic. This is about 70 times as large as the current AMIF 
1 The abstaining member states are Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.
2 For a detailed description, see Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013.
3 For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration-inte-
gration-fund/index_en.htm.
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budget, which has €3.1 billion in funding spread out over seven years. In the logic of the EU’s own 
resource system, such additional financing needs would have to come from the buffer in the EU 
revenue system which is the GNI own resource, the most important source of funding for the EU 
budget under the current financing scheme. This resource is financed by contributions from mem-
ber states in proportion to their share of total EU gross national income (GNI). We calculate that an 
additional contribution amounting to 0.21 percent of national GNI is sufficient to finance the en-
larged AMIF. This does not impose a huge burden on the member states. Lastly, we explore the 
quantitative implications of having the EU assume responsibility for both financing and administer-
ing asylum processes in its member states. Having a European service provision by a European Asy-
lum Agency would offer potential economies of scale and advantages in terms of speed and exper-
tise that would significantly reduce the costs of asylum procedures (est. €5–12 billion annually). 
Before embarking on the analysis, it is crucial that we make one important caveat: The challeng-
es of immigration in general and asylum policies in particular are highly complex and intercon-
nected. Thus, instead of being limited to good management of asylum processes, a comprehen-
sive policy must also address the root causes of flight and migration, which in turn requires broad 
reflections on new EU approaches in foreign, security and development policies. Nevertheless, 
we restrict our analysis to the narrow but crucial need of having functional and efficient asylum 
processes with an equitable and efficient division of labor between the European and national 
(i.e., member-state) levels. We also largely ignore the complex and pressing medium- and long-
term issue of integrating refugees with a residency permit into EU societies. Hence, our focus lies 
on the limited, but important and cost-intensive period between when a refugee first enters EU 
territory and when a final decision is made on whether to grant a residency permit to or repatri-
ate the asylum seeker.
We proceed as follows: After a short exposition of the current division of labor between the EU 
and member state levels, we apply fiscal-federalism criteria to judge the rationale of the status 
quo. Subsequently, we develop possible options for having more European involvement – or what 
we call “more Europe” – in asylum policies before going on to assess their particular strengths 
and weaknesses as well as quantify some of their implications. We conclude by pointing out what 
we believe to be the most desirable future direction for EU asylum policy.
Mixed Competences Under the Status Quo
A state’s duty to provide refugees with shelter originates from agreed fundamental rights and in-
ternational obligations. According to the 1951 Refugee Convention of the United Nations, a person 
must be recognized as a refugee if they have a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
The current CEAS, which contributes to fulfilling this obligation on an EU-wide scale, is character-
ized by mixed competences between EU and member states. The latter continue to be responsible 
for the reception and accommodation of refugees as well as for processing their asylum applica-
tions. In addition to providing these services, the states are also responsible for financing them.
The EU role, on the other hand, is largely one of defining common minimum standards. In terms 
of actual service provision and financing, however, the EU only plays a supporting role of minor 
importance. The EU is active along the following three dimensions:
1. The EU as a standard-setter in asylum policies
At the moment, setting standards for and fostering cooperation among member states are based 
on the following directives and regulations:
New EU Approaches  
to Address the Root of 
Flight and Migration
 ͮ the Asylum Procedures Directive,4 which harmonizes asylum procedures with a particular fo-
cus on asylum seekers with special needs (e.g., unaccompanied minors);
 ͮ the Reception Conditions Directive,5 which defines standards for material reception conditions 
(e.g., housing) and the role of detention;
 ͮ the Qualification Directive,6 which clarifies the grounds for granting international protection;
 ͮ the Dublin Regulation,7 which contains the rules designating the state responsible for exami- 
ning asylum applications while also aiming to serve as an early-warning mechanism for refu-
gee crises; and
 ͮ the Eurodac Regulation,8 which establishes the Eurodac system in order to allow the collection 
and comparison of fingerprints, thereby assisting in applying the Dublin Regulation.
These legal documents set standards of only a minimum nature, and the leeway they provide for 
nations to adopt and pursue their own approaches is still very substantial. For example, since 
member states have considerable scope for determining the humanitarian grounds on which an 
asylum seeker will be granted a residency permit, there are different acceptance rates even if EU 
rules are uniformly applied. In fact, recognition rates for asylum seekers differ massively between 
EU countries even for refugees from the same country of origin. The recognition rate for refugees 
from Syria between January 2014 and June 2015, for example, ranged from 66.5 percent in Roma-
nia to 100 percent in several other countries, including Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Slove-
nia (see Figure 1). A few countries (Croatia, Estonia and Portugal), which together received fewer 
than 30 Syrian applicants in total, rejected all asylum claims by Syrian refugees, giving them re- 
cognition rates of zero percent. Furthermore, member states also differ considerably in terms of 
other benefits they offer, such as financial assistance, accommodation and access to healthcare, 
education and labor markets. These differences lead to a very high variance in the costs of receiv-
ing asylum seekers even between countries with similar income levels (Urth et al. 2013).
2. The EU as a provider of asylum-related services
The cost-intensive task of receiving asylum seekers is currently the responsibility of EU member 
states. Thus, the essential asylum-related services are provided at the national level, including: 
4 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013L0032)
5 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013L0033)
6 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX:32011L0095)
7 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604)
8 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=celex:32013R0603)
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Figure 1: Recognition rates for asylum seekers from Syria (January 2014 – June 2015)
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. Missing countries had no asylum claims from Syrian refugees.
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registration; application for asylum; decision and appeal procedures; return; providing accom-
modation, food and social, psychological and medical assistance; and possible detention.
Compared to the national role in service provision, the EU’s role is extremely limited. In fact, it is 
basically confined to: pursuing measures to foster better cooperation among member states; pro-
viding some IT infrastructure, assistance at the Schengen borders and support in crisis conditions; 
and – as is highly topical given current circumstances – organizing schemes aimed at mitigating 
highly unequal burden-sharing. These subsidiary tasks, which are supervised by the Directorate-
General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home), are the responsibilities of the following EU-
sponsored agencies, which have a combined staff of fewer than 300 permanent employees:9
 ͮ FRONTEX, based in Warsaw with a permanent staff of 151, helps member states manage their 
borders by providing training and safeguarding common standards. It also organizes technical 
and operational assistance under special crisis conditions, such as naval rescue operations.
 ͮ The European Asylum Support Office (EASO), based in Valetta (Malta) with a permanent staff 
of 55, assists member states in training asylum officials, fostering cooperation among mem-
ber states and relocating refugees. It coordinates teams of experts to help member states han-
dle asylum applications and set up reception facilities. These teams consist of experts de-
ployed by other member states.
 ͮ Finally, the EU Agency for large-scale IT systems (eu-LISA), with locations in Tallinn and Stras-
bourg and a permanent staff of 120, provides the technical infrastructure for EURODAC, the da-
tabase for asylum seekers’ fingerprints that is the essential cornerstone of the Dublin system.
3. The EU as a source of funding for asylum-related services
As part of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014–2020, the Asylum, Migration and In-
tegration Fund (AMIF) is to provide a total of €3.137 billion in funds from the EU budget over a 
seven-year period.10 The lion’s share (€2.752 billion) is allocated to the co-financing of national 
activities, while the remaining €385 million (or merely €55 million per year) is earmarked for gen-
uine EU actions. The allocation of resources to member states correlates with the number of refu-
gees each country received during the period of the previous MFF. The national allocations are 
largely predetermined, although some variable components are given for receiving resettled refu-
gees from third countries. The predetermined (2014–2020) allocation for Germany, for example, 
adds up to €208 million, which puts the annual financial support at less than €30 million.
9 Staff numbers are taken from figures cited in the EU budget for 2015. In reaction to the surge in refugee numbers in the summer of 2015, 
the Commission pushed to have the funding of these agencies increased, resulting in 60 additional employees for FRONTEX and 30 for 
EASO.
10 Set up through Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014. In addition, the Internal 
Security Fund (ISF) provides resources for police cooperation as well as border- and visa-related activities.
Migration Fund 
Dwarfed by Refugee 
Numbers
Service provision
Financing
Defining standards
and rules
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%0%
EU Member States
Figure 2: Asylum policies: Mixed responsibilities between the EU and its member states under 
the status quo
Source: own illustration.
In summary, the current division of labor between the EU and its member states is clearly one 
that assigns primarily responsibility for providing asylum-related services and financing to the 
member states, while the EU is mainly responsible for promoting the harmonization of standards. 
Figure 2, which attempts to provide a rough visualization of the current division of labor, under-
lines how the EU plays a limited role while the member states play a significant one. 
Five Fiscal-Federalism Arguments on Why  
the Status Quo is a Failure
The current system of shared responsibilities is far from striking the right balance between EU 
and national responsibilities. This failure is made visible by chaotic ongoing developments not 
only on Europe’s external borders, but also – and much more worryingly so – on its internal bor-
ders. In what follows, we present an analysis of standard criteria for an optimum federal division 
of tasks that brings into relief the flaws of the status quo.
1. The status quo’s incentives to free ride are massive
The reception of refugees until the end of the asylum process is costly for the receiving state – 
but there might also be benefits. Over the medium and long term, the immigrants can enrich the 
culture of the receiving state and contribute to value creation, growth and perhaps even an eas-
ing of demographic ageing. However, the extent of these benefits is hard to predict since it de-
pends on whether the immigrants are successfully integrated into society and the economy as 
well as on whether the national labor market is functioning and flexible.
Furthermore, as a result of the Single Market of the EU and freedom of movement within it, it is not at 
all obvious that the long-run benefits of a successful and costly integration policy would actually be 
confined to the receiving state. In fact, key immediate benefits are clearly not limited to the receiving 
country. For example, receiving and integrating asylum seekers allows all EU member states to fulfill 
their joint obligation to safeguard a fundamental right enshrined in both European and international 
law. What’s more, doing so boosts security and stability in crisis regions by alleviating pressure in 
both crisis countries and their neighbors (Suhrke 1998). In both of these cases (and others), the re-
ceiving state provides and finances a European public good that benefits all EU member countries. 
However, this also results in a strong asymmetry between this shared benefit and the financial bur-
den a state bears alone for receiving refugees – an asymmetry that creates incentives for free-riding.
Indeed, the current data show a very uneven horizontal distribution of the burden if one accounts 
for differences in national reception capacities (Figure 3). For our calculation, reception capacity is 
determined by using a variation of the quota formula suggested by the European Commission in 
the spring of 2015 (European Commission 2015a).11 According to this formula, a country’s ability 
to absorb additional refugees is assumed to increase with its economic power, as measured in terms 
of absolute GDP, as well as with its population size. On the other hand, a country’s unemployment 
rate and the number of refugees it is already hosting are assumed to decrease its capacity. All fac-
tors are weighted differently according to their relative importance.12 Variants to the formula would 
obviously change the results, but not the overall qualitative message – namely, that the actual dis-
tribution of asylum seekers is strongly out of proportion to member states’ reception capacity.
11 The quota differs as we use the number of refugees hosted from 2010 to mid-2015, while the European Commission uses the number of 
refugees hosted between 2010 and 2014 per 1 million inhabitants.
12 The quota is computed as follows: 
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Receiving Member 
States Produce a 
European Public Good
When comparing a country’s actual burden-sharing (as determined by actual migration flows) 
with its capacity to share in this burden, a huge imbalance appears. According to these calcula-
tions, 22 EU states tend to free ride on the major reception efforts of only six countries (Hungary, 
Germany, Sweden, Austria, Belgium and Bulgaria). The breakdown of the Dublin rules becomes 
visible from the fact that, based on figures for asylum applications in 2015, two main entry coun-
tries (Italy and Greece) no longer have numbers that exceed their reception capacities. Further-
more, the relative divergence between actual reception and capacity is huge: At one extreme, you 
have Hungary, which hosts 2,000 percent more refugees than it should considering its reception 
capacity. A similar conclusion can be drawn for Sweden, Austria and Germany, which receive be-
tween 190 and 300 percent more refugees than they have a capacity to. At the other extreme, 
there are Croatia, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic 
states, where applicant number are below five percent of capacity.
One should add that the free-riding problem is not merely an internal European problem. Receiv-
ing refugees provides more of a global public good than one merely limited to Europe. All signa-
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Figure 3: Refugee reception: actual numbers vs. capacity 
Sources: Eurostat, World Bank, own calculations. Per-country figures for asylum seekers are projected from actual data from January to August 
2015. Projection assumes that country-specific monthly growth rates in applicant numbers until the end of 2015 are equal to the actual ave-
rage monthly growth rate from January to August.
We base our projections of the number of asylum seekers in Europe for 2015 on figures provided by Eurostat. The data displays all registered 
asylum seekers who made a claim for asylum in the respective country and month. The number of asylum claims is reported until June 2015 for 
all EU-28 countries, while the numbers for the following two month are not completely available yet. For this reason, we have supplied missing 
values for August and September by using the average growth rate of asylum claims between January and June. We extrapolate the remaining 
months of the year by applying the average growth rates between January and September, and project the total number of asylum applicants 
per country for the year 2015. Our projections certainly show a lower bound of the number of asylum claims, as we have only taken into account 
the official number of asylum applications. Since there is a time lag between the date when a refugee enters a country and the date when he 
or she submits an official claim for asylum (this can currently take over 3 months in some countries), we note that we have not fully tracked the 
massive inflow of refugees during August and September, who will be registered in the following months. In order to avoid any largely specu-
lative guesses, we base our calculations on the projection as described. The massive increase in the number of asylum seekers in Hungary is 
mainly due to the fact that we base our projections on a period when Hungary’s borders were open and the government was registering all inco-
ming persons. The closing of Hungary’s borders in the beginning of September 2015 reduced the pressure on the country and passed it on, so 
to speak, to other European countries, such as Austria or Germany. Thus, it is likely that our numbers are either underestimates, as in the case 
of Germany, or overestimates, as with Hungary. Nevertheless, the qualitative conclusions on unequal burden-sharing can have a firm founda-
tion even on this highly uncertain statistical basis.
tory states to the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention share the same principle obligation to provide 
shelter to refugees, and countries like the United States definitely do not bear less responsibility 
than EU countries for the current situations in Iraq and Syria. Thus, it is fair to say that the United 
States (and other wealthy countries) are currently free-riding on Europe, just as some EU coun-
tries are free-riding on fellow EU countries. Although the US government recently decided to boost 
the number of Syrian refugees the country would accept to 70,000, this figure is obviously far be-
low its reception capacities (Harris 2015).
However, this is no argument against having the EU play a larger role – or, as we say, having “more 
Europe” – in asylum policies. Instead, we believe that the issue of global free-riding can be ad-
dressed better by having a unified EU player. Unlike individual EU member states, which have 
their own varying objectives, a unified EU player could have greater influence on international 
negotiations.
2. Potential advantages of a European insurance are foregone
Refugee flows are hard to predict in terms of both size and target countries. Although some regu-
lar patterns (related to various structural push-and-pull factors) can be detected, unpredictable 
events, such as wars, lead to migration shocks. While Greece, Italy and Malta received very large 
numbers of refugees in recent years, in 2015, there was an abrupt rise in the number of refugees 
headed to Northern Europe, as it also became a main target. What’s more, Eastern Europe could 
also become a main target in the future if, for example, there were further destabilization in 
Ukraine. Introducing a more centralized approach to asylum issues could benefit all EU member 
states by offering insurance against idiosyncratic immigration shocks.
3. Member states have remarkably similar preferences on immigration
The presence of highly diverse preferences on asylum policies would constitute an obstacle to in-
troducing a more EU-centered approach to asylum policies. Current disputes within the EU (such 
as those between Eastern and Western European governments on the role of quotas) might lead 
one to conclude that there is a huge degree of preference heterogeneity. But these disputes are 
misleading. In reality, such disputes are a natural consequence of the free-riding problem. No 
matter what their populations prefers in the long-run and under a “veil of ignorance”, it is ration-
al for voters and their governments to reject quotas if they know that this will be to the own dis-
advantage in a specific situation.
To obtain more reliable insight on fundamental asylum preferences (independent of short-term self-
interests in the current refugee crisis), it is helpful to have data from the period preceding today’s 
massive increase in refugee numbers. Fortunately, Eurobarometer conducted a special survey on 
home affairs in the field at the end of 2011 (European Commission 2012). Since these data come 
from a period when the clear winner-loser pattern of the recent refugee crisis was not yet predictable, 
they provide more information on the underlying preferences than current polls do (Figure 4).
This survey shows: First, there is an overwhelming amount of popular support for providing pro-
tection to people in need (average support rate: 80 percent; lowest support rate: 65 percent). 
Equal rates of support exist for harmonizing asylum regulations as well as introducing a more equ- 
itable distribution of the numbers of asylum seekers and sharing of related costs among member 
states. In fact, these general statements on equitable burden-sharing and uniformity of rules are 
supported by an absolute majority of citizens in every single member state, including those that 
might have already been benefitting from free-riding at the time of the survey.
Overall, these survey results can be taken as evidence that European preferences on asylum pro-
tection do not vary widely, and that a more European approach would be in line with the prefer-
ences of citizens across Europe.
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4. National competition in asylum policies is inefficient
A strong argument against European centralization in other policy contexts is that national com-
petition can actually be beneficial, for example, by spurring innovation and initiating learning 
processes for national policymakers and administrations. In the context of asylum policies, how-
ever, this argument has clearly been invalidated. Given the free-riding incentives in asylum poli-
cies, national competition can be expected to lead to a “race to the bottom” in terms of reception 
Figure 4: Views on EU asylum policy
Source: European Commission (2012). Numbers on the X-axis show the agreement with the respective question on country level (orange bars) 
and the EU27-average (red bars) in percent.
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standards (Thielemann, Williams and Boswell 2010: 161). Indeed, much of the actual experience 
over recent years has only confirmed this expectation.
5. The current setup only hurts the Single Market
With its basic freedoms (i.e., the free flow of persons, goods, services and capital), the Single Mar-
ket is the cornerstone of the integration process and indispensable for the continuing economic suc-
cess of Europe. Hence, if having national responsibility for asylum issues creates significant obsta-
cles to the proper functioning of the Single Market, there is a strong case for introducing centralization. 
One such “significant obstacle” has undeniably been the reintroduction of controls at several bor-
ders within the Schengen Area since the summer of 2015. This underlines, that the current division 
of responsibilities in asylum policies runs counter to the need to keep internal borders open.
Options for Having More Europe in European Asylum Policy
From the fiscal-federalism arguments made above, there is a solid case for having more Europe 
in asylum policies. But how exactly? In principle, there are four options for how to proceed with 
the current division of competences (each of them, again, with a multitude of variants):13
 ͮ Maintaining current EU-national division of labor, but with full implementation of the  
Dublin system
 ͮ Maintaining the current EU-national division of labor, but replacing the Dublin system  
with quotas
 ͮ Continuing national service provision, but having the EU finance national asylum policies
 ͮ Having the EU assume responsibility for providing and financing asylum services.
1. Status quo with full implementation
One straightforward option would be to simply implement what has already been agreed to: the 
Dublin system for the distribution of refugees, accompanied by an actual harmonization of pro-
cedures and the implementation of standards for refugee reception. This approach is the strat-
egy of the European Commission, which adopted a package of 40 infringement decisions in Sep-
tember 2015 against 19 member states for failing to fully implement CEAS legislation.
We doubt that this option is desirable. In fact, we don’t even think it is viable. It is undesirable be-
cause the Dublin rules create a system of burden-sharing that is randomly determined by geogra-
phy and the contingencies of refugees’ main entry points or intra-EU migration flows. The massive 
inequities resulting from these factors undermine the democratic acceptance and legitimacy of 
CEAS. As a consequence, the expectation that the current CEAS can be fully implemented simply 
by applying more EU pressure is unrealistic. Indeed, a system that stands in sharp contrast to ba-
sic considerations of fairness in the eyes of voters, politicians and administrators will suffer from 
the outright and latent resistance of all these groups – and will therefore not be successful.
2. Quotas replacing Dublin
Under the current CEAS system, quotas are of marginal importance and only used as a minor buff-
er against excessive differences in refugee distribution across EU member states. For example, 
in September 2015, the European Commission decided to relocate 120,000 refugees from Italy, 
Greece and Hungary by using quotas. However, the quotas applied so far have done nothing to 
seriously correct the inequities of the Dublin system.
13 Thielemann, Williams and Boswell (2010) presents a similar range of future policy options for CEAS.
10 | ZEWpolicybrief ZEWpolicybrief | 3 policy brief ZEW policy brief | 11
Return to 
Dublin System No 
Desirable Option
A seemingly obvious option is to entirely replace the Dublin principle, with its random outcomes, 
with full-scale quotas. In a pure quota system, countries’ capacities to receive refugees (regard-
less of how they are calculated) would fully determine the distribution of asylum seekers no mat-
ter where they entered the EU.
This option has an obvious appeal: It tries to distribute the costs for the provision of a European 
public good – namely, refugee reception – based on an ability-to-pay principle, where this abil-
ity is defined on the basis of reception capability. Thus, it addresses the free-rider problem while 
also providing an effective insurance to member countries: Large, sudden inflows of refugees to 
a few countries are translated into much smaller reception numbers for all EU member countries.
The major downside of quota models is that far-reaching quotas imply the relocation of a huge 
number of refugees among EU countries. Currently, very moderate numbers of relocations can 
still account for preferences as well as any ties of refugees to a specific country (e.g., one in which 
they have relatives), so it is largely based on voluntary relocations. However, given today’s sheer 
numbers of asylum seekers, comprehensive quotas could no longer pay much heed to the coun-
try preferences of refugees.
This fact has all sorts of negative humanitarian effects and is likely to darken the prospects of 
successful integration. On top of that, it substantially raises the cost of asylum policies (Boswell 
2003; Thielemann, Williams and Boswell 2010). Indeed, forced relocations are expensive (since 
they involve measures like detention), and they simply might not work if refugees prefer to go 
into hiding and stay in their preferred country illegally. Forced relocations also may re-raise the 
issue of border controls within the Schengen Area in order to prevent illegal movements of asy-
lum seekers between countries.
Figure 3 (above) indicates the relocations that would be needed it they followed the suggested 
capacity index. Based on the projected number of new asylum applicants in 2015 (1.82 million), 
this would imply the relocation of some 923,000 people to another member state. In other words, 
every second asylum seeker entering the EU would have to be moved between member states. 
For example, under a quota-driven relocations scheme, countries like France, Spain and the UK 
would have to accept more than 100,000 asylum applicants each.14
It is clear that the financial and political costs of such a massive (and, in many cases, forced) re-
location of people are likely to be prohibitive. Quotas may – and should – play a larger role in the 
future, but they need to be part of a more comprehensive approach that also addresses the un-
derlying causes of the massive imbalances we are currently witnessing.
3. EU financing of national service provision
If a more equitable system of burden-sharing cannot realistically be achieved by simply redistrib-
uting refugees, financial compensation could do the trick. Paying countries to host refugees rath-
er than shifting them around would obviate all costs and humanitarian issues related to forced 
relocations. With this kind of financial compensation, the inequality of the burden borne by a re-
ceiving state would be corrected. In other words, though the state would still have to provide the 
service, it would no longer be left to pay the entire check.
One precondition for establishing a far-reaching system of EU compensation for national service 
provision is having a high degree of uniformity in terms of the minimum standards applied. Thus, 
EU financial support can be regarded as conditional: It must only be paid out to those countries 
that fully respect the standards set by the CEAS directives. Of course, a country would still be free 
to offer more generous conditions to refugees, but its national budget would be fully responsible 
14 In our calculations related to quotas and EU financing, we assume that all 28 EU member states would participate in these comprehensive 
schemes (i.e., we also include those who have currently opted out of the CEAS system).
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for anything going above and beyond what the directives stipulate. Moreover, any system of EU 
financing would have to avoid creating any incentives for anything but a swift execution of asy-
lum procedures. Thus, it must be based on a flat-rate payment per asylum case rather than being 
designed to offer full compensation for actual costs.
Our study’s estimates are based on the radical case of having full EU financing of national asylum 
services. We assume that the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) would fully reimburse 
member states for any asylum services they provide up until a final decision has been made on an 
application. We also assume that this much larger AMIF would continue to be funded by the EU budg-
et, as having the European budget finance European public goods seems like an obvious solution. 
Lastly, we assume that the current national contribution shares to the EU budget remain constant.
Obtaining data for the budgetary costs of providing asylum-related services is a tricky task. There are 
two studies that have tried to obtain such data from EU countries themselves (Thielemann, Williams 
and Boswell 2010; Urth et al. 2014; see Appendix).15 The differences in per-case amounts between 
countries are huge and cannot be explained by different costs of living alone, since differences are 
also substantial between countries of similar income levels. Instead, these disparities point to se-
vere data limitations and/or a high degree of variance in terms of actual service provision. Higher 
costs in the UK, for example, can be ascribed to the more widespread use of detention.
To cope with this problem, we base our quantification on an anchor provided by Thielemann, Williams 
and Boswell (2010: 88): a standardized average measure of unit costs across EU countries for the 
year 2007 per asylum application.16 We then inflate this amount in proportion to the growth in nomi-
nal GDP between 2007 and 2015 (resulting in an EU average of €16.570 per asylum application).17
In the following, we assume that this amount also indicates the (GDP-adjusted) costs of asylum 
services at a truly unified EU standard (assuming a convergence to the mean of current EU stand-
ards). On that basis, we are able to provide country-specific unit costs that, by design, only mir-
ror differences in GDP (see Appendix). The assumption is that country costs vary with average 
income (which approximates differences in the costs of living, including health-related service 
provision, accommodation and transfer needs).
Table 1 summarizes the emerging costs per EU country and in total, which are based on estimates 
of the uniform service unit costs that would arise in 2015 – given our projection of refugees for 
the year 2015 described above (Figure 3). The resulting total budgetary estimate is €30.3 billion, 
or 21.5 percent of the current 2015 EU budget (€141.2 billion). According to our projections, this 
amount would suffice to finance the processes of all asylum seekers who apply in 2015. If we as-
sume that the flow of new asylum seekers will remain at that constant level, this amount can be 
viewed as the necessary annual budget for handling asylum seekers.
According to the logic of the EU budget, any expenditure increase would have to be financed by 
the revenue buffer in the EU own resource system which is the GNI own resource, the most im-
portant source of funding for the EU budget under the current financing scheme. This resource is 
financed by contributions from member states in proportion to their share of total EU gross na-
tional income (GNI). In the 2016 draft budget, the GNI own resource amounts to 0.71 percent of 
GNI (“rate of call”), which raises revenues of €104.5 billion (European Commission 2015b: 
L699/8). A full financing of asylum policies would increase the GNI rate of call by 0.21 percent-
age points, to a new total of 0.92 percent. In other words, a full EU financing of the European asy-
15 All these data collections relate to direct budgetary costs for asylum reception. Additional types of costs – whether indirect (related to 
integration efforts) or intangible (resulting societal changes that may be perceived as positive or negative) – are not taken into account.
16 National unit costs are adjusted in proportion to a country’s per capita GDP to the EU average (population weighted); see Thielemann, 
Williams and Boswell 2010, Appendix 4.
17 In Germany, the federal government has recently committed itself to reimbursing the 16 federal states for each applicant with €670 per 
month, which amounts to annual unit costs of €8,040 (assuming the procedure lasts 12 months). No information was given on whether 
this refund is meant to be a partial or full compensation for all costs incurred. Furthermore, this refund is meant to help the states perform 
reception services, whereas it is still the central government’s responsibility to execute and fund the asylum procedure.
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lum procedures could be financed by having each member state contribute an additional 0.21 
percent of its national GNI to the EU budget. Seeing that this would significantly mitigate a major 
conflict threatening the integration process, it hardly seems like an excessive burden.
This magnitude of a full EU financing of asylum-related services would, of course, fluctuate de-
pending on the actual number of asylum seekers. Moreover, such EU financing would not imply 
an increase in actual costs, but rather a mere shifting of expenses from the national to the Euro-
pean level. The redistributive effects (which would benefit member states with large numbers of 
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Table 1: Cost estimates for EU financing of 2015 asylum applications
Asylum  
applications
Annual costs per 
case (in €)
EU financing
(in billions of €)
EU 100 percent
EU financing
(in billions of €)
EU 50 percent
Germany 514,240 21,163 10.8828 5.4414
Sweden 139,249 25,814 3.5946 1.7973
Hungary 509,677 6,628 3.3781 1.6890
Austria 124,984 22,674 2.8339 1.4170
Italy 121,644 15,581 1.8954 0.9477
France 88,979 19,128 1.7020 0.8510
Netherlands 61,468 22,791 1.4009 0.7004
Belgium 64,248 21,337 1.3709 0.6854
United Kingdom 59,670 22,907 1.3669 0.6834
Finland 21,278 21,977 0.4676 0.2338
Denmark 14,956 27,151 0.4061 0.2030
Spain 21,872 13,663 0.2988 0.1494
Greece 18,193 9,419 0.1714 0.0857
Luxembourg 2,357 49,767 0.1173 0.0587
Poland 17,061 6,686 0.1141 0.0570
Ireland 4,382 24,535 0.1075 0.0538
Bulgaria 20,919 3,430 0.0718 0.0359
Cyprus 2,306 11,744 0.0271 0.0135
Malta 2,373 11,337 0.0269 0.0135
Czech Republic 1,726 8,953 0.0155 0.0077
Portugal 1,196 10,000 0.0120 0.0060
Romania 1,656 4,593 0.0076 0.0038
Estonia 417 9,012 0.0038 0.0019
Latvia 489 7,326 0.0036 0.0018
Lithuania 464 7,558 0.0035 0.0018
Slovenia 288 10,756 0.0031 0.0015
Slovakia 236 8,314 0.0020 0.0010
Croatia 194 5,988 0.0012 0.0006
Total 1,816,522 30.2859 15.1430
Source: Own calculations (as explained in text) based on cost data from Thielemann, Williams and Boswell (2010); for the calculation of the 
number of asylum applicants, see footnote 13.
National EU  
Contribution + 0.21 % 
of GNI
asylum applicants) are intentional and necessary as a hedge against free-riding. There are obvi-
ous options for limiting the burden on the EU budget, such as national co-financing (for example, 
having national co-financing of 50 percent would reduce the EU funding need to €15.1 billion). 
Interestingly, quotas would not have a cost-dampening effect by relocating applicants to member 
states with lower costs of living locations. In fact, a cost calculation based on quota-allocated 
applicants (instead of on actual current distribution) would even slightly increase the financing 
required from the EU budget (from €30.3 billion to €30.7 billion). The effects of moving appli-
cants to cheaper locations in Eastern Europe would be overcompensated from the increase of 
applicants in expensive locations, such as France or the United Kingdom.
Although the financing solution has its merits, there are obvious downsides. For one, the financ-
ing approach would only alleviate the burden that receiving states bear during the asylum pro-
cess, but it would not offer any compensation for the medium- and long-term financial and soci-
etal-integration costs, which would follow a positive asylum decision and may be very significant. 
Thus, free-riding incentives may still be substantial, and the strong imbalances in refugee distri-
bution would simply continue. Yet another problem is that making financial assistance contingent 
on meeting minimum standards simply might not work. Under the status quo, member states al-
ready do not respect the minimum standards set by EU directives. For this reason, it is doubtful 
whether a new system based on EU financing but continuing national responsibility for service 
provision would result in full compliance.
4. Full EU provision of asylum services
An even more encompassing move toward granting the EU full responsibility for the asylum pro-
cess would shift service provision from the national to the European level. In the most far-reach-
ing variant, all asylum cases would be processed in a fully harmonized EU system in which an EU 
agency would provide all asylum-related services within the member states themselves. With this 
option, instead of merely supporting national asylum administration, the European Asylum Sup-
port Office (EASO) would replace it. To do so, the EASO would need to be transformed into (what 
we will call) the European Asylum Agency (EAA), which would have comprehensive responsibility 
for organizing and administering the asylum process in all EU member states using funds from 
the EU budget.18 As a result, the nature of the funds calculated in the preceding section would 
change: Instead of being used to reimburse member states for any asylum services they have 
provided, this money would fund the European agency taking over responsibility for service pro-
vision on the territory of member states.
The EU financing arrangement discussed above would already deal with the problem of free-rid-
ing to a certain extent while also providing member states with some effective insurance against 
the financial burden of unexpected idiosyncratic immigration waves. But there could be even 
more benefits from going one conceptual step further: If the EAA were to take over all responsi-
bility for asylum procedures from national administrations, the full and credible unification of 
standards would be achieved. As a result, an individual member state could no longer impose 
externalities on its fellow member states by diverging from uniform EU standards.
Another possible benefit of having the EU assume responsibility for asylum processes is the po-
tential cost savings. Granted, it is impossible to infer the extent of economies of scale in service 
provision from a cross-country comparison of asylum costs in the status quo. As explained above, 
the huge variance in asylum costs (see Appendix) reflects both data problems and vast qualita-
18 In their in-depth study, Urth et al. (2013) analyze several options for joint processing. In addition to the far-reaching option of full EU 
service provision, they elaborate more limited variants, including one that would extend EU crisis support. They do not regard the 
far-reaching option as politically feasible (p. 27), but this assessment may now have been changed as a result of the dramatic failure of the 
institutional status quo.
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tive differences in service provision and asylum approaches. Nevertheless, there are a number 
of quantitative hints and compelling arguments indicating potential savings along several 
dimensions:19
 ͮ In countries with a homogenous group of asylum seekers, caseworkers would be able to pro-
cess more cases per year than their counterparts in countries with heterogeneous groups (Urth 
et al. 2013: 89–90). This indicates specialization advantages over all phases of the asylum 
process, including preparation, decision-making (through economies in information provision 
on country of origin) and appeal procedures. If properly organized, the EAA could reap these 
benefits.
 ͮ Some of the countries with very high per-case costs are ones with both a very low number of 
asylum seekers and a GDP level far below the EU average (Thielemann, Williams and Boswell 
2010: 87). This is a clear indication of high fixed costs and economies of scale.20
 ͮ Having the EU provide all services (and financing) would render the Dublin system redundant. 
No mechanism would be needed to determine the member state bearing these responsibili-
ties since the EU would have taken them over. As a consequence, all particular Dublin-related 
tasks and expenses, including the administration and enforcement of Dublin transfers, could 
be eliminated.
 ͮ A European solution may be better at coping with volatility in the regional distribution of im-
migration flows. As things now stand, national administrations suffer from capacity constraints 
that lead to costly delays in asylum decisions. A European administration, however, could more 
easily shift its resources to the critical entry points and speed up final decisions.21
No reliable quantifications for potential economies of scale exist or could be derived given the 
available data. However, we can indicate potential magnitudes using assumption-based scenar-
ios. For that purpose, we distinguish between the different categories in asylum-related costs. A 
European service provision, for example, is likely to have a larger cost-saving potential when it 
comes to assessing applications than providing healthcare services to applicants. Whereas econ-
omies of specialization could be larger for the former, they would be smaller for the latter.22
Table 2 provides an estimate of the cost structure of asylum expenses derived from a country sur-
vey (Thielemann, Williams and Boswell 2010: 90). On that basis, we calculate a “moderate” and 
an “optimistic” scenario with respect to the cost savings from European processing. For example, 
we assume that an EAA could provide housing to refugees at a cost advantage of 5 percent for 
the moderate scenario (and 30 percent for the optimistic scenario) compared to national provi-
sion. An advocate of the optimistic scenario for housing would point to the shorter duration of 
the asylum process, which would consequentially reduce the need to finance accommodation 
over the course of the asylum procedure. In line with the above reasoning, we assume that econ-
omies of scale have a larger potential for the asylum process as such than for the costs of recep-
tion (e.g., for providing housing, healthcare and material reception items, such as clothing and 
food). We assume that the largest savings from European service provision would come in the 
areas of custody and travel expenses, which are strongly influenced by the Dublin rules under the 
status quo.
19 Here applies one caveat that is standard in any reflections on a transfer of competences to the EU level: Economies of scale are only 
realistic if the service continues to be applied at average wage scales of national administrations. If average national pay were replaced by 
EU salaries, the most likely impact would be a cost push rather than a balancing of any economies in European service provision (for an 
example of this based on European defense, see Bassford et al. 2013).
20 The example given is Estonia, which had a very low number of applicants in the reference year. No evidence exists on whether economies 
of scale are still important at the much larger numbers characterizing the current situation. Calculations by the authors do not indicate 
economies of scale for Germany’s 16 federal states, with their different sizes and numbers of asylum cases.
21 Under the status quo, the EASO already has the function of organizing assistance for particularly needy member states in order to speed 
up decision-making processes. An EAA might be able to act even more quickly and shift a much larger amount of resources.
22 For a similar approach to the potential cost savings resulting from EU service provision, see Heinemann et al. 2013.
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The scenario-based calculus indicates cost savings ranging between 16 and 40 percent as a con-
sequence of European service provision. In absolute terms, based on the calculations for total costs 
for 2015 presented above, this would amount to savings of between €4.8 billion and €12 billion.
A further crucial advantage of EU service provision over a mere EU financing approach is that it 
addresses some of the important causes of the huge imbalances currently seen in refugee distri-
bution. First, the effective full harmonization of hosting conditions, asylum procedures and rec-
ognition rates would significantly lower the incentives of asylum seekers to concentrate on a few 
EU member countries. Second, member states would no longer be able to apply “deterrence strat-
egies” by having miserable reception conditions or very low application-approval rates. Third, the 
EAA would be able to organize and provide the infrastructure necessary for a well-balanced spa-
tial distribution of reception facilities across all EU member states. Thus, this system would 
achieve the goal of introducing a quota system while simultaneously providing the infrastructure 
and incentives needed to make this system work.
Conclusion
It is common knowledge that, by revealing the shortcomings of the status quo, deep crises offer 
opportunities for institutional change. This fully applies to the current division of labor in Euro-
pean asylum policies. The massive surge in refugee numbers since the spring and summer of 
2015 has triggered a chaotic situation in which even the internal open borders of Europe – one 
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Table 2: Scenarios on economies of scale from EU service provision in asylum policies
Share of  
cost item,  
in percent
Assumed cost advantage  
of EAA (costs EAA/current costs,  
in percent)
Resulting costs,  
as a percentage of  
current total costs
Cautious Optimistic Cautious Optimistic
(1) (2) (3)
(4) =
(1) x (2)
(5) =
(1) x (3)
Housing 42.7 95 70 40.5 29.9
Healthcare 4.6 95 70 4.4 3.2
Material reception 
conditions
11.5 95 70 10.9 8.0
Translation 1.0 80 60 0.8 0.6
Application  
assessment
13.8 80 60 11.0 8.3
Legal aid 3.9 80 60 3.1 2.3
Legal appeals 1.2 85 65 1.0 0.8
Taking and storing 
fingerprints
0.2 100 95 0.2 0.2
Custody 15.6 50 20 7.8 3.1
Travel 2.2 50 20 1.1 0.4
Other costs 3.5 100 100 3.5 3.5
100.0 84.3 60.3
Sources: Column (1): Thielemann, Williams and Boswell 2010: 90; columns (2) and (3): scenario assumptions; columns (4) and (5): own 
calculations.
Savings of up to 40%
of the biggest and most salient achievements of the European integration process – are at risk.
Fiscal-federalism arguments can help us understand how the current division creates poor incen-
tives and is probably much more expensive than it needs to be. In this study, we have explored 
the options for reform and assessed some of their quantitative implications. When evaluating 
the basic alternatives to the status quo (quotas, EU financing and EU service provision), we tend 
to discard the potential of quotas for refugee relocation which are introduced in isolation. Al-
though quotas by themselves could have a limited function, they could hardly cope with the dras-
tically uneven flow of refugees since their enforcement would imply up to 1 million (mostly invol-
untary) relocations for one year only, based on a conservative estimate of asylum-applicant 
numbers for 2015.
Compared to the political and humanitarian challenges of such massive relocations, the financial 
remedy against free-riding would have much less dramatic consequences. According to our cal-
culations, a very moderate increase (0.21 GNI percentage points) in each member state’s annual 
GNI-based contribution to the EU budget would already suffice to fully fund the asylum procedure. 
However, a pure financing approach could not eliminate all free-riding incentives and does not 
address the uneven distribution of refugees. Instead, having the EU assuming all responsibilities 
for financing and administering the asylum process appears to be the superior approach. First, 
there are strong indications that substantial costs savings could be expected from such a com-
prehensive EU responsibility. Second, a European Asylum Agency would benefit from information-
related advantages, a superior ability to cope with an uneven concentration of entry points and 
cost savings resulting from speedier processing times. Third, a level playing field of hosting con-
ditions, asylum procedures and recognition rates would eliminate the current incentives for refu-
gees to concentrate on a few countries. For these reasons, we recommend a system that would 
combine EU financing with EU service provision. 
Without a doubt, the political obstacles to introducing a more European approach are huge. The 
dramatic events in 2015 have clearly identified who the winners and losers of the status quo are, 
and the status quo appears to be comfortable for the winners. On top of that, there are many more 
free-riding winners than heavily burdened losers (see Figure 3). In reality, the only way past these 
obstacles might be expanding the definition of who the “losers” are in such crises. Indeed, if we 
look at the situation in broader political and economic terms, allowing national egoism to prevail 
in asylum policies actually means that all EU member states will ultimately suffer from unpredict-
able losses and integration risks. In this sense, there should be incentives for all EU member 
states to advance toward truly European asylum policies.
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Appendix
Table 3: Data on annual costs per asylum application (in Euro)
Source
TBW, 
2007 
Own calculation, 
2015, Inflated  
with nominal  
GDP growth  
2007–2015,  
own calculation
Own Calculation,  
2015, Standardized 
costs of uniform  
provision, account-
ing for GDP per  
capita differences,  
own calculation
U, 2011:  
Whole  
procedure, 
including  
return and  
reception
U, 2011:  
Reception 
only
Belgium 24,875 28,090 21,337 “Country B” 6,743
Bulgaria 375 527 3,430 “Country C” 26,874
Czech Republic 375 431 8,953 “Country E” 1,477
Denmark 26,250 28,642 27,151 “Country F” 30,755 23,000
Germany 53,125 63,194 21,163 “Country G” 24,066 18,381
Estonia 20,625 26,420 9,012
Ireland 78,125 73,591 24,535
Greece - - 9,419
Spain 5,000 4,916 13,663
France 9,750 10,552 19,128
Italy 1,250 1,223 15,581
Cyprus 2,500 2,225 11,744
Latvia 2,375 2,905 7,326
Lithuania - - 7,558
Luxembourg 39,750 44,478 49,767
Hungary 125 141 6,628
Malta 10,000 13,732 11,337
Netherlands 70,000 73,369 22,791
Austria 14,375 16,489 22,674
Poland 1,250 1,753 6,686
Portugal 1,500 1,554 10,000
Romania 1,500 1,975 4,593
Slovenia 1,875 1,994 10,756
Slovakia 1,875 2,578 8,314
Finland 25,000 26,771 21,977
Sweden 11,250 12,808 25,814
United Kingdom 33,750 37,670 22,907
Average 17,475 19,304
Standardized 15,000 16,570
Sources: TBW: Thielemann, Williams and Boswell 2010: 85 (Fig. 22). Note that there was a degree of imprecision with the data because it was 
presented in a bar chart.  A request to the authors for more precise data was unsuccessful. U: Urth et al. 2013: 92. Urth only provides anony-
mized country information.
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